Tuskira AdvisoryConfirmed (CISA KEV)Last updatedNovember 16, 2026

CVE-2026-84869

How to tell if CVE-2026-84869 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect technician client) is reachable in your environment

Latest change
First published. Huntress reports technician workstations compromised in November; the KEV deadline passed Sept 14.

Reachable if any technician, help desk machine or access agent runs a ScreenConnect client before 26.6.5, even when the server is already updated or hosted in ConnectWise's cloud

Affected
ScreenConnect Support and Access session clients before 26.6.5, on-premises and cloud. The server itself is not affected
Exploitation
On CISA KEV since Sept 11. Huntress reports technician workstations compromised Nov 12 and 13.
Fix
Update to 26.6.5 or later, then update every technician host client and access agent.
Can't patch today
Remove the TransferFiles permission from every role and restrict guest joins, per ConnectWise and Huntress

If your MSP or help desk updated the ScreenConnect server and stopped there, you are still exposed. CVE-2026-84869 lives in the client that runs on each technician's machine, and Huntress says attackers used it this month to take over technician workstations. ConnectWise rates it 9.9 Critical and fixed it in 26.6.5 on September 8. CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on September 11 with a September 14 deadline, so any team still on an older client is two months past that date.

ConnectWise says a condition in the client can let files be transferred and run through an active remote session without authorization or host confirmation. Its fix covers the Support and Access session clients. Cloud customers had their servers updated for them, and ConnectWise still tells them to update host clients and access agents.

Huntress reported on November 16 that one technician workstation was fully compromised on November 12, with a rogue remote access tool installed, and that a test file ran on a second technician's client the next day. It also saw at least four other technicians exposed in October. Huntress says to treat a compromised technician as if the attacker saw everything that technician could see. No public exploit code has been posted.

Is it reachable for you?

What it is. ConnectWise says the ScreenConnect client may allow files to be transferred and executed through an active remote session without authorization or host confirmation, including through elevated execution actions. The vulnerable code runs on the machine of the person running the session. The server is not the vulnerable part, which is why a server update alone leaves it open.

Who is most exposed. Huntress says the activity it saw targeted MSP technicians, whose machines hold access to every customer they support. Internal help desks that run ScreenConnect face the same risk on a smaller scale.

Checks, in three tiers. The first decides exposure. The second and third decide priority. Run these only on systems your organization owns.

  1. Is every technician client on 26.6.5 or later? Check the installed ScreenConnect client version on each technician and help desk machine, and on access agents. A server on 26.6.5 does not update clients that are already installed. Cloud customers need this check too.
  2. Do roles still allow file transfer? In Administration, Security, Roles, check each role and session group for the TransferFiles permission. Roles that keep it are the ones ConnectWise's temporary mitigation removes.
  3. Who can start or join sessions? Check whether guests can join sessions freely, whether the web interface and installer pages are reachable from anywhere, and whether technicians join unattended sessions they don't recognize. Huntress names all three as ways to cut exposure.
What Tuskira checks for this flaw in your environment
Technician and help desk machines running a ScreenConnect client before 26.6.5
Customer and internal environments reachable from those technicians' accounts
Across every system you run.
See how Tuskira finds exposed systems

Compensating controls (test them, don't assume them)

ConnectWise says its temporary mitigation is not a substitute for the update. These steps cut exposure until every client is updated.

  • Remove TransferFiles. In Administration, Security, Roles, edit each role, review every session group with permissions, deselect TransferFiles and save. Repeat for each role, per ConnectWise.
  • Restrict guest joins and access. Limit who can join sessions, and limit the web interface and installer pages by IP or VPN, per Huntress.
  • Change technician habits. Tell technicians not to join unattended or unfamiliar sessions until their client is updated, per Huntress.
  • If a technician was hit. Isolate the workstation and rotate every credential that technician could reach, per Huntress.

What to look for in logs

Huntress published these hunting steps with its November 16 report.

  • On the server, review a copy of the session database for file execution events coming from guest connections and for sessions with blank names.
  • On technician workstations, look for the ScreenConnect host client launching scripts from its Temp folder, new Startup folder entries, and unfamiliar ScreenConnect clients connecting to relays you don't own.
  • On the network, look for outbound ScreenConnect relay connections to domains you don't own.

FAQ

Am I exposed to CVE-2026-84869?

You are if any technician or help desk machine runs a ScreenConnect client before 26.6.5. Updating the server does not update clients already installed, per Huntress and ConnectWise.

Is CVE-2026-84869 being exploited?

Yes. CISA added it to KEV on September 11, 2026. Huntress reported a fully compromised technician workstation on November 12 and a second hit the next day.

We use ScreenConnect Cloud. Are we covered?

Only partly. ConnectWise updated cloud servers, and it still tells cloud customers to update their host clients and access agents.

We patched in September. Are we done?

Only if every technician's client was updated too. If only the server was upgraded, update the clients now and run the Huntress hunting steps on this page.

Is there public exploit code?

None has been posted. The exploitation reports come from Huntress and CISA.

Vendor
ConnectWise
Product
ConnectWise ScreenConnect, remote support and remote access
Affected versions
ScreenConnect before 26.6.5, per ConnectWise. The flaw is in the Support and Access session clients that technicians run. ConnectWise says ScreenConnect servers are not impacted
Vulnerable component
Host and access session clients, which can receive and run transferred files during an active remote session
CVSS
9.9 Critical (ConnectWise, CVSS 3.1)
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (ConnectWise)
CWE
CWE-862, CWE-269 (ConnectWise)
Exploitation
Confirmed (CISA KEV)
CISA KEV added
September 10, 2026
Patch
ScreenConnect 26.6.5 or later. Cloud servers are already updated, but technician host clients and access agents still need the update. Automate partners update through Automate Product Updates. Out-of-maintenance licenses must be renewed before upgrading

Updates

Nov 16, 2026. First published. ConnectWise fixed CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect 26.6.5 on September 8; CISA added it to KEV on September 11; Huntress reported technician workstation compromises on November 12 and 13.

Sources

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We publish an advisory when a vulnerability is Critical or on CISA KEV, has one identifiable component to check, and has a public proof of concept or reported exploitation. Advisories are updated as exploitation status changes.